We analyze the incentives for a two-sided intermediary to divert consumers to its favored destinations. Using a quasi-experiment to control for search intent, we identify and measure the impact of a search engine's exclusive award of preferential placement to its own service. We find that Google's differential placement of its Flight Search service led to a 65% decrease in click-through rates for non-paid algorithmic links and an 85% increase in click-through rates for paid advertising listings of competing online travel agencies. Moreover, the exclusive integration of search engine services into search results disproportionately impacted traffic to popular sites.
Introduction
Multi-sided intermediaries face mixed incentives when designing platforms which facilitate interactions between multiple types of users. In the context of intermediaries that help consumers find services, one design objective is typically to reduce a consumer's search cost in finding the desired service (Spulber, 1996) . Another design goal may be to divert consumers to services which generate higher profit margins (Hagiu and Jullien, 2011) . Although these motivations have been analyzed theoretically in the literature, few studies have attempted to measure the net effect of these conflicting incentives.
We examine diversion incentives in the context of a search engine which can steer consumers' attention away from non-paid algorithmic search results, and towards results that benefit the search engine more directly. A search engine can reap two kinds of direct benefits from the links it shows: First, some results feature the search engine's own services.
These results lead to landing pages where search engines have additional opportunities to earn revenue, such as by charging service fees or selling advertising. Second, some web sites are willing to pay for their listings to be shown to consumers-the popular search advertising offering that now totals $37 billion per year in the US.
1 To increase the proportion of consumers who pay attention to a search engine's own services and to paid advertising, sophisticated intermediaries may use their control of search result placement and format to direct consumers' attention accordingly, for example by reducing the prominence of non-paid algorithmic results. A search engine's incentive to divert consumers in this way depends on consumers' response to diversion.
Measuring the net effect of search diversion is important for understanding the extent to which search engines and other intermediaries may act to influence consumer behavior.
Following the Chicago school tradition, Bork and Sidak (2012) argue that consumers would switch to a different search engine if they did not like search diversion or the search results they received, and thus that search engines do not have an incentive to present non-paid results that consumers dislike. In contrast, if a search engine were able to divert consumers attention without consumers noticing or taking action, the resulting search engine incentives would more likely call for policy intervention.
We make two contributions. First, we develop a theoretical model to establish conditions for when a search engine chooses to divert search to a less relevant service. We consider a search engine that simultaneously displays paid and non-paid links to its own services and others' services, and consumers who choose between a search engine's own service and competing services without internalizing the impact of their choice on search engine revenues.
We model search engines as two-sided platforms with objectives over both consumer surplus and advertising revenue. For consumers, there is never a charge to click a link, 2 which suppresses price signals to consumers as to which links are more advantageous for search engines. Thus, search engines may have an incentive to divert search to correct the failure of the price mechanism to allocate efficiently.
Our model predicts that search engines have a larger incentive to divert search when they are able to alter consumers' perceptions of the difference between non-paid and paid placements, and when search engines place a large weight on revenue. These results are consistent with instances where some search engines have labeled paid links with confusing euphemisms or not at all, 3 and where some search engines have mixed paid and non-paid links in the same area of the screen.
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Second, we measure the impact of a diversion mechanism where a search engine exclusively awards a non-paid preferred placement slot to its own service. Specifically, we examine Google's preferred placement of Flight Search (henceforth GFS). Beginning in December 2011, Google sometimes inserts a special GFS "OneBox" above the top algorithmic link. When the GFS OneBox appears, it always takes top position, thereby pushing all non-paid, non-GFS placements to lower positions in the results listing. For the period in our data, similar search queries received differential treatment, with regards to the insertion of the GFS OneBox, based on only minor variations in search phrase. For example, "flights to orlando" systematically showed the GFS OneBox whereas "flights to orlando fl" did not.
A key empirical challenge in identifying the extent of search diversion involves endogeneity relating the search engine's design choice with consumers' search behavior. Both may be correlated with the displayed links to the specified search queries. To overcome this challenge, we leverage on the quasi-experiment resulting from the exogenous variation in OneBox placement. Specifically, we use a difference-in-difference estimator to measure the search diversion from exclusive preferential placement by comparing the before-after change in click-through rates across similar searches that are differentially treated by GFS.
Our paper draws upon a large dataset aggregated from actual search engine usage by a representative panel of internet users.
Our analysis indicates that there was an 85% increase in click-through rates for paid advertising and a 65% decrease in click-through rates for non-paid algorithmic search traffic to competing online travel agencies. Both changes are statistically significant, providing evidence of Google's ability to influence how consumers choose services at the intensive margin, after they search. (We abstract away from whether a search engine can influence how consumers choose to search, for example by entering different search queries or by otherwise learning to use search engines differently.) We also examine heterogeneity in the impact of search diversion across sites, and we find that search diversion had the largest impact on the online travel agencies receiving the most traffic from Google.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews recent developments in the placement and visual design of search engine results. Section 3 presents our theoretical model of search diversion incentives. Sections 4 and 5 contain our empirical measurement of search diversion. Section 6 concludes.
Related Literature. Our paper contributes to a growing literature on multi-sided platforms (Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Evans, 2003; Armstrong, 2006; Tirole, 2003, 2006; Weyl, 2010) . Specifically, we build on papers that consider how platforms exert control over interactions between different sides of the market via strategic actions such as openness (Boudreau, 2007; Parker and Van Alystne, 2013) and exclusive contracts (Arm-strong and Wright, 2007) . 5 Closest is Hagiu and Julien (2011) , which identifies incentives for platforms to exert control by diverting search based on uninternalized externalities on both the consumer and seller sides of the market. Their work is theoretical whereas the primary contribution of our paper is empirical, verifying the existence of and measuring these incentives.
The design of search engines has been a subject of recent interest (Wilson, 2011) . Most of this literature focuses on the design of sponsored ad auctions and recent papers have begun to incorporate user behavior (Aggarwal et al, 2008) , including features such as the design of optimal search (Athey and Ellison, 2011; Chen and He, 2011) and the roles of prominence (Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou, 2009; White and Jain, 2010) , targeting strategies (De Cornière, 2011) and quality degradation of results (Eliaz and Spiegler, 2011; Taylor, forthcoming) . Some papers incorporate both non-paid and paid links, and study how this interplay changes advertisers' bidding incentives (Xu, Chen and Whinston, 2011) and prices (White, 2009) . De Cornière and Taylor (2012) study how the integration of a search engine and publisher increases market power over the supply of advertising space to advertisers.
Our model abstracts away from issues related to pricing mechanisms as well as equilibrium pricing and quantities of search advertising, instead focusing on the interaction between platform design and the incentives to divert search.
Previous studies have examined the empirical relationship between search behavior and search engine design features. For example, Ghose and Yang (2009) use data from a large advertiser to estimate the determinants of click-through rates, and Jerziorski and Segal (2009) use data from Microsoft AdCenter to study how consumers search. Other papers have tried to understand consumer search by tracking users' eye movements (Pan et al, 2007) and through laboratory experiments (Jansen et al, 2009 ). Our approach differs in that we aggregate actual search engine usage behavior, and use exogenous variation in the display of search results to identify search diversion. This reduces endogeneity concerns in the display of search results, and our real-world data avoids some limitations of lab experiments.
Using this approach, we address the issue of bias in non-paid search results (Edelman and Lockwood, 2011; Tarantino, 2011; Wright, 2011) .
In general, our paper is related to public policy pertaining to multi-sided platform economics (Evans, 2003; Rysman, 2009) , vertical relations (Rey, Seabright and Tirole, 2001; Rey and Tirole, 2007) , and tying (Whinston, 1990) , as applied to linking internet search with other search engine owned services. We identify a diversion mechanism that can be broadly classified under the literature on behavioral nudges (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) , which are used to influence preferences.
Exclusive Design Choices and Search Diversion
Multi-sided intermediaries have become increasingly sophisticated in using design features to influence consumer search outcomes. This is especially true of online platforms which act as a gateway between consumers and the internet-a position which gives platforms special influence over which sites users visit, including where they shop and what they buy. Intermediaries divert search for many reasons. For example, Netflix uses an online recommendation system to manage its video rental inventory by diverting user attention away from films likely to be in short supply (Shih, Kaufman and Spinola, 2007) . During a dispute with American Airlines over booking fees and commissions, online travel site Expedia made many of American's flights hard to find and removed some completely. 6 Advertisingsupported intermediaries (including print magazines and online portals) often display ads prominently to generate advertising leads, and adjusting advertising placement can make the advertising more or less valuable for different advertisers (Kempe and Mahdian, 2008 Figure 1 ). Some search engines may award special placements to their own services, such as of those in adjacent markets for image search, restaurants, hotels (right screenshot of Figure 1 ), maps, shopping, videos, and, the focus of this paper, air travel. These placements of the search engine's own services are also sometimes associated with a preferential format, including unusual layout, color, images, or interactivity unavailable to listings for other services. Although special search results can benefit users by presenting useful information especially quickly, they also change how web sites compete for consumer traffic, and have raised competitive concerns. Web sites competing with search engine owned services have alleged that the use of preferential placement and format in non-paid listings diverts consumers' attention away from the non-paid listings of excluded sites that are more established and more relevant to a consumer's search query.
3 Model
We now model a search engine's incentives in assigning placement to its own service and to a competing service. The model allows search engines to have different values for clicks to both types of services, and for diversion incentives to vary with search frictions associated with different slot placements. Our analysis establishes conditions for when a search engine chooses to divert search, and analyzes the effects on consumer surplus.
Setup. We consider the search engine as a platform maximizing dual objectives, with weight γ on consumer surplus and 1 − γ on advertising revenues.
A market consists of a continuum of mass one of consumers. Each consumer in the market enters a similar search query, observes search results, then chooses either the search engine's own service (i = 1) or a competitor's service (i = 0). Services are vertically differentiated by their "relevance" to the search query, which we denote as ρ i for service i. Services are also horizontally differentiated and located at the two ends of a Hotelling segment of unit length, on which consumers are uniformly distributed. Let d i be the consumer's distance from service i.
Two non-paid slots. Ignoring paid placement, we first consider how a search engine would assign two non-paid slots (j = a, b). The timing proceeds as follows:
(i) Consumer runs a search.
(ii) Search engine assigns placement of slots j to services i.
(iii) Consumer observes search result placement, and chooses which link to click.
When clicking a link, the consumer incurs the non-negative "search disutility", β k , associated with placement k of the clicked link. In clicking to service i in placement k, let consumer utility be
We normalize slot a's search disutility as β a = 0 and slot b's search disutility as β b = β,
indicating that slot a's placement is "preferred" to slot b. We also normalize ρ i > 1 + β for all i, representing that every consumer strictly prefers to end the search by clicking on either link rather than by not clicking any link at all.
When service 1 is assigned preferential placement, consumers click on service 1 if
When service 0 is assigned preferential placement, consumers click on service 1 if
In Figure 4 , we identify the share of consumers who click on service i when service k receives preferential placement, which we denote by s i,k (ρ 0 , ρ 1 , β). 
When service k receives preferential placement, consumer surplus is given by
Simplifying (4), we obtain
which we difference to construct the following expression
A search engine would maximize consumer surplus by assigning preferential placement to service 1 when CS ∆ (ρ 0 , ρ 1 , β) > 0, or more simply when its own service is more relevant to the search query, ρ 1 > ρ 0 . This consumer surplus benchmark motivates the following definition of search diversion.
Definition. Search diversion occurs when a search engine assigns preferential placement to the less relevant service.
Let v 1 be the value per-click that the search engine extracts from its own service. For example, this may be the revenue the search engine collects from paid aspects of the results it
shows (e.g. advertising fees from airlines shown in a GFS OneBox). By assigning preferential placement to service k, the search engine's weighted objective function is
where the first part of the expression denotes the search engine's weight on consumer surplus and the second part of the expression denotes the search engine's weight on the value from its own service. Using (5) and (6), we define the following expression, which lets us state our first result.
Proposition 1. (a) With non-paid slots only, a search engine diverts search to its own service if either: (i) v 1 is sufficiently large, and/or (ii) γ is sufficiently small.
(b) With search diversion, the loss in consumer surplus increases with β and (ρ 1 − ρ 0 ).
Intuitively, the search engine has a large incentive to divert search when it extracts a large value from visits to its own service relative to its weight on the consumer's loss from visiting a less relevant service. This loss in consumer surplus increases with the search frictions, β, that consumers face in substituting to the more relevant service.
Adding a paid slot. Search engines simultaneously display unpaid listings and paid advertisements. We now consider how a search engine would assign two non-paid slots (j = a, b) when it also offers a paid slot (j = c) to a competing service. When a consumer clicks on a link in the paid slot, the consumer incurs a non-negative "ad disutility" cost equal to α. Because advertising typically appears in prominent positions (e.g. above other results or otherwise at the top of the page), we set slot c's search disutility to equal to slot a's, with the search engine extracts from service 0 when a consumer clicks on the paid link. When β < α (search disutility less than ad disutility), the consumer chooses between the two nonpaid slots regardless of which service is assigned preferential placement, and the analysis of diversion incentives follows from Proposition 1.
When service 1 receives preferential placement and β > α (search disutility greater than 
where the second part of the expression denotes the search engine's value from clicks to its own service as well as advertising revenues from the paid slot. The search engine's weighted objective function from assigning preferential placement to service 0 is
where the second part of the expression now considers only the search engine's value from clicks to its own service. From (4), let
Using (8) and (9), the search engine's gain from assigning preferential placement to service 1 when β > α simplifies to
The preceding expression illustrates the relationship between diversion incentives and search frictions from consumers' ad disutility. (10) implies the following result.
Proposition 2. (a) With both non-paid slots and a paid slot, a search engine diverts search to its own service if either: (i) v 1 is sufficiently large, and/or (ii) γ is sufficiently small.
(b) When β > α and v 0 < v 1 , the search engine's incentives to divert search are increasing in the consumer's ad disutility α.
(c) When β > α and v 0 > v 1 , the search engine's incentives to divert search are decreasing in the consumer's ad disutility α.
The search engine may choose to divert search if the second term in (10) is sufficiently large such that π ∆ (ρ 0 , ρ 1 , α, β) > 0. When the search engine extracts more value from clicks to competing services than from its own service (v 0 > v 1 ), the search engine's incentive to divert search to its own service is decreasing in consumer ad disutility α. Intuitively, a low ad disutility increases the ability of search engines to divert consumers to a competing service's paid links. Conversely, a high ad disutility may also increase consumer demand for the search engine's own services. This second effect may dominate when the search engine extracts more value from clicks to its own service (v 1 > v 0 ).
Propositions 1 and 2 show how design features (such as ad disutility α), search engine objectives (such as weight γ) and the value-per-click to its own service (such as v 1 ) are related to a search engine's incentives to divert search. We note that the search engine's ability to control placement and format can endogenously influence both α and γ. For example, a search engine can reduce consumer distaste for ads by altering the differential appearance of non-paid and paid links (e.g. by reducing the prominence or clarity of labels on paid links, or by reducing the format differences and colors associated with paid links). A search engine can also place greater emphasis on extracting value from its own services by embedding interactivity to its own results (e.g. by placing direct booking links for flight and hotel results). Diverting search to the search engine's own service allows for the accumulation of more consumer data, which endogenously increases the search engine's opportunities to pursue further monetization, such as via improved ad targeting, leading to a self-reinforcing cycle.
Our model provides a simple characterization of the impact of search diversion on outgoing web traffic to competing services. Dropping the competing service from the preferred non-paid slot to the second non-paid slot decreases the number of clicks from
, a loss of β non-paid clicks. When β > α, the number of paid clicks to the competing service increases by
. In the following sections, we measure the effects of search diversion by measuring changes in outgoing web traffic as users click results at search engines.
Methodology and Data
Research Design. To test whether a search engine is able to divert consumer search through the exclusive award of preferential placement and/or format, we seek to measure the relationship between changes in the design of the search engine results page and the consumer's probability of clicking the various links that are shown.
An ideal experiment would build on random assignment of preferential placement and preferential format across a sample of internet searches. If placements sometimes randomly favored the search engine's own services and sometimes randomly did not, we could determine the effect of an exclusive award of preferential placement on clicks by simply comparing behavior in the two randomly-assigned conditions. With random assignment of display format, we would not need to worry that a search engine favored its own service exactly when it was most relevant. Unfortunately, we do not have the ability to run such a randomized experiment on actual search engines.
To obtain the benefits of random favored treatment of a search engine's own links, we rely on a quasi-experiment resulting from Google's introduction of its travel search service, Google Flight Search. If a search query follows certain patterns we have identified, Google displays GFS results in a preferential top-of-page location. However, GFS results do not appear for all search queries expressing similar intent. For example, in the relevant time period, a Google search for "flights to orlando" led to the exclusive preferential placement of GFS, but a Google search for "flights to orlando fl" did not. These differences were systematic and persisted for at least the first four months of 2012.
During the time period immediately after the introduction of GFS, only certain search queries triggered the display of GFS: The search query needed to specify a US destination from among at least several hundred that Google had preapproved. With even a minor variation, such as "Orlando FL" rather than "Orlando", GFS links did not appear. Our approach tracks click behavior associated with search queries matching Google's GFS criteria.
Specifically, we perform a before-after comparison of click-through rates to competing travel sites, across groups of search queries similar in consumer intent but which differ in whether they trigger the exclusive preferential placement of GFS.
Data. Our data comes from ComScore Search Planner, a commercial database tracking online behavior of a panel of internet users. ComScore tracks both algorithmic and paid clicks on search engines. For each time period and each group of search queries, we observe traffic volumes for exact-match searches yielding the specified sites. ComScore adjusts observed traffic volumes based on panel and census-based weights. We assume each internet search concludes with a single click, and infer total searches as the sum of non-paid algorithmic and paid clicks. We consider internet searches during the four months prior to the launch of GFS, from May to August 2011, and the four months after the launch of GFS, from January to April 2012. We intentionally omit the four months immediately surrounding the launch of GFS: During this period, the GFS result was displayed in a sidebar with gradual phase-in, which made the appearance of GFS links unpredictable.
The "total market" of internet searches in our dataset comprises all searches that: (i) occurred during our time period, (ii) express search intent for flights to US destinations (we omit non-US destinations since GFS added international support significantly later), and (iii) led to a visit to at least one of 23 popular travel sites. The travel sites consist of 6 large US airlines and 17 online travel agencies. We limit our analysis to these 23 sites due to data constraints. In particular, less popular travel sites receive too few clicks from searches for flights to US destinations following one of the search patterns we specify. The 23 sites comprise 97% of traffic for the searches we study. Our online data appendix presents details of our data sources and instructions for replicating our data construction using Comscore Search Planner.
We analyze only clicks resulting from "specific" search queries for identified US flight destinations. For one, these specific queries are the impetus for display of the GFS links we study. Furthermore, specific queries tend to have higher conversion rates (to actual purchases) and are particularly valuable to travel sites. We ignore search queries which directly specify a desired site ("Orbitz", "Jetblue") or do not specify a flight destination ("cheap flights") because the wording of these "general" queries never prompts the display of GFS during the time period we consider.
By nature, specific search queries are idiosyncratic in phrasing and may not be amenable to repeated observation, requiring us to aggregate over searches. To allow some expression of heterogeneous intent, we group searches along two dimensions. First, we subdivide searches by the intended flight destination expressed in the search query. The map in Figure 6 illustrates our division of flight destinations into six US geographic regions: (i) midwest,
(ii) mountain west, (iii) northeast, (iv) pacific west, (v) southeast, and (vi) southwest. We tested perturbations to our definitions of geographical aggregation, and results were robust to changes. Our dataset is insufficiently rich to test finer levels of aggregation. www.google.com, both manually and using automation.) Thus, the "treatment effect" of exclusive preferential placement differentially affects groups of internet searches in our data. Table 1 describes the composition of searches in our sample. In total, we consider over six million Google searches, of which about two thirds were associated with a GFS-eligible search query. About 46% of searches concluded with a click on a paid link, indicating levels of search engine advertising consistent with the high commercial value of specific search queries. Over 93% of searches ended with a click to an online travel agency, which is consistent with search intent focused on comparison shopping between different airline options. The 23 "popular" travel sites we consider account for about 97% of clicks from our sample of internet searches.
GFS-eligible vs. GFS-ineligible search queries. Our analysis of search diversion relies on the identifying assumption that Google classifies search queries as GFS-eligible
versus GFS-ineligible in a manner that is orthogonal to consumers' decision of which site and type of link to click. To confirm this assumption, we first check for apparent differences in user intent across search queries. In Table 2 , we see that for each flight destination region, the average query length is similar for GFS-eligible and GFS-ineligible search queries, within a single word and less than one standard deviation apart. Table 3 provides examples of GFS-eligible and GFS-ineligible search queries. Although the phrasing differs, search intent is virtually identical. For example, as the first row suggests, preferential placement of GFS occurs when a consumer queries "flights from <US city name> to <US city name>" but not for "flights from <US state name> to <US city name>". Table 4 presents example queries for flights to Tampa Bay, Florida with no apparent systematic difference between GFS-eligible and GFS-ineligible queries.
We next check whether Google classifies queries as GFS-eligible based on differences in what consumers click. Table 5 reports a logistic regression of the probability that the search query entered during the pre-GFS period (May to August 2011) was eventually classified as being GFS-eligible. In Column 1, we see that GFS-eligible and GFS-ineligible queries are not statistically significantly different in their probability of a consumer clicking a paid link. Column 2 adds a supplementary dataset of ad exposures for each group of search queries. With this addition, we check whether Google classified GFS-eligible and GFSineligible queries according to whether they were likely to lead to sites for which consumers were exposed to a high volume of paid advertising at search engines. We see that GFS-eligible and GFS-ineligible queries are not statistically significantly different in their probability of a consumer visiting a site within the top 50 percent of advertising exposures, either via a paid advertising link or via a non-paid algorithmic link. Column 3 shows that this result holds when controlling for the flight destination in the search query. These analyses suggest that Google's display of GFS results is orthogonal to factors related to a consumer's click decision.
Aggregating to Click-through Rates. Our dataset consists of a panel of click-through rates (CTR) associated with our grouping of searches by flight destination and GFS eligibility.
An observation is a travel site's CTR for a group of search queries averaged over a period of two months in the dataset. CTRs are calculated by dividing the search engine traffic volume to each site by the query group's total searches in each time period. Aggregating CTRs to the two-month level ensures that unusual search phrases appear with sufficient frequency. Table 6 provides descriptive statistics for CTRs. We examine three types of CTRs.
First, we construct the probability of clicking a non-paid algorithmic link to each travel site, calculated over the number of searches in each query group. Second, we construct the probability of clicking a paid link to each travel site, calculated over the number of searches in each query group. Third, we construct the probability of clicking a paid link to each travel site, calculated over the number of ads shown by that travel site (taken from our supplementary dataset).
8 Table 6 reveals no systematic CTR differences between GFS-eligible and GFS-ineligible search queries. For each of the three methods of CTR calculation, GFS-eligible and GFSineligible queries have similar CTR (within half a standard deviation), although a high standard deviation indicates that travel sites differ greatly in their relative ability to attract clicks. There are also no significant systematic differences in CTR across regions. These findings are consistent with our assumption of exogeneity of GFS display. Because the number of observed visits to airline sites is small, the remainder of our analysis focuses on search traffic to the sample of 17 online travel agencies. For similar reasons, we use paid CTR as in columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 , rather than columns 5 and 6.
Limits to CTR Analysis. Our aggregation of searches into click-through rates allows us to incorporate limited controls for user intent into our regressions. In principle, we would like to fully control for the expressed intent in each search query, perhaps by observing consumer search histories in the same way that is feasible for a search engine. Unfortunately, this is outside the scope of our data. Instead, we take the approach of averaging over groups of searches made by consumers with similar intent as expressed in their search queries. This allows us to characterize the average treatment effect on the user's probability of visiting a specific travel site. Orbitz's paid traffic grew from around 650 to 2,150 clicks (an increase of 230%) whereas non-paid algorithmic traffic dropped from around 6,000 to 1,900 (a decrease of 68%). On net, the ratio of Orbitz's paid to algorithmic traffic grew by around 850%.
Empirical Analysis
Impact on Composition of Web Traffic. We now measure the impact of search diversion on the composition of web traffic to online travel agencies competing with GFS. Table 6 and Figure 8 indicate that click-through rates are highly heterogeneous across searches. We regress click-through rates on Google's exclusive preferential placement of GFS, including every interaction of fixed effects for site visited, flight destination region and GFS eligibility.
These fixed effects control for cross-sectional heterogeneity across sets of searches and allow a consistent estimate of the impact of exclusive preferential placement when differences in expected set-level errors remain correlated with unobserved components of user intent. Further, we include dummy variables at the site-time level and at the region-time level. This controls for time-varying factors such as seasonal differences across sites' search advertising expenditures, and seasonal differences across search advertising expenditures for different geographical regions.
The regression equation is
where i indexes sites, j indexes flight destination region, k indexes GFS eligibility, t indexes a bi-monthly time period, µ ijk indicate set-level fixed effects, β 2 is the coefficient on dummy variables at the level of site and time period, and β 3 is the coefficient on dummy variables at the level of region and time period. The dependent variable y ijkt represents the CTR (nonpaid algorithmic or paid, depending on the specification) to a given online travel agency.
Because we control for all cross-sectional heterogeneity and their corresponding interaction terms, we cannot independently separate the impact of any time-invariant observables from the fixed effects. Rather, our identification of search diversion relies on the discrete change and differential treatment in Google's exclusive preferential placement of GFS, expressed by pref erence ijkt . This approach allows us to estimate β 1 , the effect of exclusive preferential placement of GFS on clicks to competing online travel agencies.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 report our estimates of β 1 on the level and log click-through rates of paid links to online travel agencies. On average, the exclusive preferential placement of GFS increased the paid CTR from 0.061 to 0.113 (a 85% increase). Clustering standard errors at the level of site and region, these estimates are at least statistically significant at the 5% level. In column 3, we add data from GFS-ineligible searches on Bing and Yahoo! that used these same search queries during this time period. Our regression equation becomes:
where l indexes search engine and β 2 is the coefficient on a dummy variable that controls for time-varying factors at the search engine and site level. Because we observe fewer searches across flight destination region for Bing and Yahoo!, we do not allow further search engine heterogeneity at the region-time level, and only cluster standard errors at the level of site and search engine. (If we allow time-varying heterogeneity across flight destination regions on Bing and Yahoo!, the lack of observations leads to a highly singular variance matrix for determining standard errors.) Although standard errors are larger, our estimated coefficient is similar and statistically significant at the 10% level.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 report a similar fixed-effects analysis on the level and log clickthrough rates of non-paid algorithmic links. The exclusive preferential placement of GFS diverted search by decreasing the click-through rate of non-paid algorithmic links from 0.062 to 0.022 (a 65% decrease). Clustering standard errors at the level of site and region, these estimates are at least statistically significant at the 1% level. Column 3 of Table 8 reports the analysis on the log click-through rate of non-paid algorithmic links using additional data from GFS-ineligible searches on Bing and Yahoo! that used these same search queries during this time period. Our estimated coefficient is similar and statistically significant at the 5% level. Combined, Tables 7 and 8 suggest that the net search diversion impact of Google's exclusive preferential placement of GFS was to increase traffic volumes to online travel agencies from paid links, and to reduce traffic volumes to online travel agencies from non-paid algorithmic links.
Differential Impact of Search Diversion. Next, we examine how Google's exclusive preferential placement of GFS diverts search differentially across competing online travel agencies. Table 9 indicates that GFS has a large, significant impact on the five online travel agencies receiving the most traffic from the search terms we examine: these sites suffer an algorithmic CTR drop from 0.072 to 0.014 (a 80% decrease), and a gain in paid CTR from 0.078 to 0.203 (a 160% increase). In contrast, the remaining sites in our sample receive limited impact (not statistically significantly different from zero).
To understand the differential effect on top sites, we review the sample of specific searches used in our analysis. As shown in Tables 3 and 4 , search intent is highly focused on price comparison, including a high frequency of search phrases with terms like "cheap flights"
and "cheap air fare". In response to these searches, Google historically largely offered nonpaid algorithmic links to sites whose domain names indicate a special expertise in low-cost travel. Specifically, of the five most popular sites shown in response to the specific search terms, four include "cheap" or similar in their names: farecompare, cheapoair, cheapflights and farespotter. The only exception is Expedia, which does not have "cheap" or similar in its name, but has the largest market share among online travel agencies. Thus, it seems that search diversion had the largest effect on these sites which were highly ranked among non-paid algorithmic links for being the most relevant responses to these search queries.
Conclusion
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first measurement of the existence and magnitude of search diversion. We show that an intermediary's incentives to divert search are increasing in the value extracted from its own service and the intermediary's weight on this value, and are related to the intermediary's ability to influence consumers' perceived differences between paid and non-paid placements. As intermediaries become increasingly sophisticated in their use of placement and format, these effects are likely to become even larger.
We highlight that search diversion is especially prevalent, and likely to be increasingly so, among online intermediaries. Internet platforms have the ability to implement design changes quickly, easily, and often using mechanisms that are less than transparent even to discerning users. In our application to search engines, the selection, ordering, and format of search results is determined by a proprietary search algorithm with little information available to the public. In this environment, competition authorities have suggested that competition in adjacent online sectors may be under threat. 9 This is consistent with our GFS analysis, which finds a decrease in non-paid algorithmic traffic to online travel agencies for search queries subject to exclusive preferential placement.
Simultaneously, we find significant cost increases for internet startups that obtain large quantities of incoming traffic from search engines. These increases in costs could deter entry into affected sectors. 10 Our analysis indicates that search diversion particularly harms the sites that provide services most relevant to users' search queries. Possible extensions could investigate the extent to which search diversion impacts long run search behavior and consumer welfare, and could examine how firms in the online travel industry respond. GFS-eligible queries GFS-ineligible queries cheap flight to tampa cheap flights to tampa fl cheap flights to tampa cheap flights to tampa, fl cheap flights to tampa bay cheap one way flights to tampa cheap flights to tampa florida cheap airline tickets to tampa fl cheap tickets to tampa florida cost of tickets to fly to tampa bay flights from chcago to tampa, florida flights from chicago to tampa, fl flights from newark to tampa flights to tampa fl flights to tampa flights to tampa, fl nyc to tampa flights flights to tampa bay fl flights to tampa florida from dfw flights to tampa fl from shreveport, la Last verified: 1/5/2013. Search queries not distinguished between upper and lowercase. Note: An observation is a Google search during May to August 2011, in the period before GFS was introduced. Reported values are exponentiated coefficients, or odds ratios from a logistic regression on the probability that the search query used was later classified by Google as being GFS-eligible. T-statistics in parenthesis are calculated from robust (White) standard errors, clustered at the level of the website and one of six US geographic regions forflight destination. Asterisks indicate * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Note: An observation is a paid CTR to one of seventeen online travel agencies over a group of searches for a period of two months. The first two columns consider only Google searches, and report robust (White) standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the level of website and one of six US geographic regions for flight destination. The third column considers searches from Google, Yahoo and Bing, and report robust (White) standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the level of website and search engine. Asterisks indicate * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01. Note: An observation is an algorithmic CTR to one of seventeen online travel agencies over a group of searches for a period of two months. The first two columns consider only Google searches, and report robust (White) standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the level of website and one of six US geographic regions for flight destination. The third column considers searches from Google, Yahoo and Bing, and report robust (White) standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the level of website and search engine. Asterisks indicate * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Note: An observation is a click-through rate to one of seventeen online travel agencies over a group of searches for a period of two months. The first column considers the top 5 most visited websites for our sample of specific search queries: farecompare.com, cheapoair.com, expedia sites, cheapflights.com and farespotter.net. The second column considers the twelve remaining online travel agencies. Robust (White) standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the level of the website and one of six US geographic regions for flight destination. Asterisks indicate * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
